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1 Introduction
There are noticeable low-frequency movements in the U.S in
ation data. For in-
stance, the in
ation rate as measured by the GDP de
ator in Figure 1 shows an
upward trend during the 1960s and 1970s. This upward trend is reversed after the
Volcker disin
ation period of the early 1980s. To t this persistent in
ation process,
estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models often model the
central bank's in
ation target as a nonstationary process (e.g., Smets and Wouters
(2005), Ireland (2007).1 The permanent shifts in the in
ation target induce a com-
mon trend for nominal interest rates. Unit root tests of in
ation and interest rates
in Table 1 provide evidence for such a specication. Under this specication, the
entire yield curve, not just the short rate, re
ects the movement of in
ation target,
because long-horizon in
ation expectations aect long-term rates. Accordingly, us-
ing the entire term structure of interest rates can provide additional information in
estimating in
ation target, which is not directly observed but is a key determinant
of long-horizon in
ation expectations.
In this paper, I estimate a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model using yield
curve data on top of macro data. In the model, monetary policy follows a nominal
interest rate rule with a drifting in
ation target. The main focus of this paper is to
use the estimated DSGE model to nd out the information content of the yield curve
about the time-varying in
ation target of the central bank. The model features i)
imperfect information of private agents about in
ation target and ii) time-varying
volatility in the macro shocks.2
There are two main ndings from this study. First, the estimated target from
the DSGE model indeed captures the common trend for nominal interest rates and
1Of course, the Federal Reserve's in
ation target is only implicitly dened because the Federal
Reserve has not adopted explicit in
ation targeting.
2See Beechey (2004), Dewachter and Lyrio (2008), and Dewachter (2008), Erceg and Levin
(2003), and Schorfheide (2005) on the implications of imperfect information for expected in
ation.
On the other hand, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2007) emphasize
the role of the time-varying shock volatility as opposed to changes in monetary policy in explaining
macroeconomic 
uctuations in the U.S.2
in
ation. There are two pieces of evidence for this nding. First of all, unit root tests
for in-sample nominal interest rates and in
ation data detrended by the estimated
target reject the existence of unit roots at 5% level. In addition, the estimated target
is highly correlated with long-horizon in
ation expectations based on survey data
that are not used in the estimation. Second, the model estimates imply that agents
learn the in
ation target of the central bank quickly relative to what is implied by
existing studies (e.g., Erceg and Levin (2003), Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)).
This paper is related to the literature which links term structure data with
changes in monetary policy.3 Papers most closely related to this work are Dewachter
and Lyrio (2008) and Dewachter (2008), who study the role of changing beliefs about
the in
ation target in small scale New Keynesian models estimated using macro
and yield curve data. Dewachter and Lyrio (2008) assume that the actual target is
constant or chairman-specic but the perceived target by private agents drifts like
a random walk. Their setup implies that the dierence between the actual target
and the perceived target can be nonstationary, preventing private agents from ever
learning the actual target. On the other hand, Dewachter (2008) assumes that the
actual target itself drifts ,like this paper, but allows for nonstationary real interest
rates. However, the unit root test results for interest rates in Table 1 provide little
evidence for nonstationary real rates.
Other related papers are Kozicki and Tinsley (2001, 2005) and Cogley (2005)
who try to identify shifts in monetary policy using term structure data in reduced-
form models. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) argue that incorporating term structure
information into long-horizon in
ation expectations reduces the variation of the
term premium and supports a more substantial role of short rate expectations in
explaining term structure data. Cogley (2005) conveys the same message by using
a VAR with drifting coecients and volatilities for the short rate and a measure of
term spread. While this paper also nds a signicant time variation of long-horizon
in
ation expectations, it ties down the law of motion for macro variables and the
3A non-exhaustive list of papers on this topic includes Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007), Bekaert
et. al. (2010), Cogley (2005), Dewachter (2008), Dewachter and Lyrio (2008), Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001, 2005), Rudebusch and Wu (2008).3
learning speed of agents by DSGE restrictions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the macro
DSGE model and discusses its log-linear approximation and equilibrium nominal
bond yields based on the log-linearized model. Section 3 discusses the empirical
analysis and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The model economy is a standard new Keynesian monetary DSGE model with opti-
mizing households and monopolistically competitive rms that face price stickiness
as in Woodford (2003).
2.1 Firms and Production Sector
I assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms in the intermediate prod-
uct markets. Firms in the competitive nal-goods market combine the intermediate









; $t > 1: (1)
$ is the elasticity of substitution among dierent intermediate goods. The demand














Pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i. All rms in the intermediate product
markets have production technologies that are linear in labor (Nt(i)), which they
hire on a competitive market.
Yt(i) = AtNt(i): (3)4
Total factor productivity At contains a stochastic trend and the growth rate of At
follows a stable AR(1) process with time-varying volatility.4
lnAt = lnAt 1 + ua;t ; ua;t = (1   a)u?
a + aua;t 1 + a;t ; a;t  iidN(0;2
a;t 1)
2
a;t = (1   a)2
a + a2
a;t 1 + w;awa;t ; wa;t  iidN(0;1): (4)
The model features a nominal rigidity in the style of Calvo (1983). Each period
only (1   ) fraction of the rms can reoptimize their prices while the other rms
adjust their prices by the previous period's in
ation rate.5 The optimal price, Po
t (i),














where Wt+s is the nominal wage, and Mt;t+s is a stochastic discount factor that rms
use to evaluate their future prot streams. In equilibrium, the stochastic discount
factor is identical to the one derived from household optimization problem.
If prices were 
exible, the prot maximization of rms in monopolistically com-
petitive markets would make the price markup equal to ft = $t
$t 1. This markup
determines the equilibrium output level known as the natural rate of output. I
assume an AR(1) process with time-varying volatility for the log markup.
lnft = (1   f)lnf? + f lnft 1 + f;t ; f;t  iidN(0;2
f;t 1)
2
f;t = (1   f)2
f + f2
f;t 1 + w;fwf;t ; wf;t  iidN(0;1): (6)
4This specication for time-varying volatility does not guarantee the nonnegativity of the vari-
ance. Nonetheless, when the standard deviation of innovation to the volatility (w;a) is small
relative to 
2
a and a, the chance of hitting the zero bound is practically negligible (less than 5%),
which is indeed the case in my estimates. Alternatively we can assume an AR(1) process for the log
of the variance, which guarantees the nonnegativity. However, this assumption makes equilibrium
bond yields complicated nonlinear functions of time-varying volatility. The Gaussian specication
for the variance ensures that equilibrium bond yields are linear with respect to the time-varying
volatility.
5Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) use the same indexation rule by the lagged in
ation.
I assume a full indexation scheme to make sure that rms which do not optimize their prices can
still catch up with trend in
ation.5
2.2 Household Optimization
The economy is populated by a continuum of representative households who max-
imize their expected discounted lifetime utility with respect to consumption of the





























where  is the constant relative risk aversion, and  the short-run (Frisch) labor
supply elasticity. Consumption is de
ated by the current technology level as in
Schorfheide (2005). This assumption makes the marginal benet of working more
hours bounded despite a growing real wage and ensures a balanced growth path.6





Pn;t(Bn;t  Bn+1;t 1)+Mt +Tt = WtHt +B1;t 1 +Mt 1 +Qt +t (8)
where Pt is the price level, Pn;t the price of an n quarter bond, Bn;t bond holding, Tt
lump-sum tax or subsidy, Qt the net cash 
ow from participating in state-contingent
security markets, and t the aggregate prot.
The nominal stochastic discount factor between period t and t + s implied by












The government does not make any independent expenditure and its budget
constraint is simply
P1
n=1 Pn;t(Bn;t Bn+1;t 1)+Mt Mt 1+Tt = B1;t 1. Therefore,
the market clearing implies that the aggregate consumption will be equal to the
aggregate output (i.e. Ct = Yt).
6If  is equal to 1 (the log utility case), this detrending is irrelevant because the marginal utility
of consumption grows at the same rate as real wage, making the marginal benet of working more
hours stationary.6
2.3 Monetary Policy and In
ation Target
The central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate according to a forward-looking
Taylor rule with policy inertia. The nominal target interest rate (i?
t) reacts to
expected in
ation and the output gap in the following way:
(1 + it) = (1 + i?
t)1 i(1 + it 1)i expfi;tg ; i;t  iidN(0;2
i;t 1)
1 + i?










i;t = (1   i)2
i + i2
i;t 1 + w;iwi;t ; wi;t  iidN(0;1)
(10)
where r? is the steady state real interest rate, which is equal to eu?
a
   1, ?
t the
time-varying in
ation target of the central bank ,and Y n
t a natural rate of output,
which will prevail in a 
exible price economy.
In the model, agents observe the current in
ation target but do not distinguish
the permanent component (
P;?
t ) from the transitory noise component (
T;?
t ) as
in Erceg and Levin (2003). They face a signal extraction problem when forming















t 1 + ?;t ; ?;t  iidN(0;2
?;t 1)
2
?;t = (1   ?)2
? + ?2
?;t 1 + w;?w?;t ; w?;t  iidN(0;1):
(11)
Under the above assumptions, agents lter out the transitory component by
Kalman ltering in order to forecast the future in
ation target as follows.
Et(ln?
t+j) = ln?


































t is the covariance matrix of the ltered estimate. t is the gap between the
expected future in
ation target and the current in
ation target, which measures the
















The evolution of the degree of imperfect credibility is tightly linked with the




n ). When the ratio goes to 1, 
t
2
n also approaches 1 and
the target is fully credible, implying t is close to 0. On the contrary, if the signal
to noise ratio is suciently small, the gap between expected and current target
behaves like a nonstationary variable. Erceg and Levin (2003) assume that agents
use the steady state Kalman gain, which implies the constant covariance matrix of
the ltered estimate. In contrast, I consider a time-varying gain. This time-varying
gain is more suitable for the environment with time-varying volatility.
2.4 Log-linear Approximation of the Full Model
I log-linearize the system of equations around the deterministic steady state to
derive the macro dynamics implied by the model. To induce stationarity, output is
detrended by technological level while the in
ation rate and the nominal interest rate
are detrended by the in
ation target. Steady state values for the detrended variables
are dened by setting all the exogenous shocks at their unconditional means forever.7
The percentage deviation of a detrended variable dt from the steady state is denoted
by ~ dt.
I dene the vector of relevant detrended state variables x
f
1;t by
[~ yt; ~ t; ~ it; ~ yn;t;ua;t;uf;t;Et(~ yt+1);Et(~ t+1)+t]. Equilibrium conditions from the log-





1;t1 + t + t t = [a;t;f;t;i;t;wt]0 (14)
wt = ln?
t   ln?
t 1 ; t = [~ yt   Et 1(~ yt); ~ t   Et(~ t+1)   t] (15)
The following representation of the dynamics of state variables as the solution of
the above linear rational expectations system can be obtained by using a numerical











7Without uncertainty, rms do not need to reoptimize their prices. So in the steady state, the
actual output would be equal to the natural rate of output.
8The details of the solutions procedure can be found in the appendix available upon request.8
Now, dene a new set of state variables x1;t by substituting Et(~ t+1) for Et(~ t+1)+
t in x
f
1;t. Notice Et(wt+1) = t and use the law of motion for t in equation (13).
Finally, we obtain the following solution of the log-linear model in terms of x1;t.
x1;t = Tc;t + T1x1;t 1 + T;tt ; t = [a;t;f;t;i;t;wt]0: (17)
2.5 No-arbitrage Term Structure Model
Following Jermann (1998) and Wu (2006), I combine the log-linear approximation
to the DSGE model, with asset pricing methods based on the log-normality of the
stochastic discount factor. The log stochastic discount factor implied by the macro
model is linear with respect to the detrended macro variables. By taking the log of
both sides in equation (9), we obtain the following expression:
mt;t+1 = lnMt;t+1 = ln  (yt+1  yt) ua;t+1  t+1 = Et(mt;t+1)+tt+1 (18)
where t denotes a vector of market prices of risk, which is entirely restricted by the
structural parameters. Learning about in
ation target introduces time variation in
the market prices of risk through the time-varying gain 
t.9
From households' optimal asset allocation, the risk-adjusted return on bonds of
dierent maturities must be equal to 1.
1 = Et(emt;t+1+pn 1;t+1 pn;t): (19)
Here pn;t is the log price of the the constant maturity n quarter bond. I dene the
vector of nonstationary variables by x2;t = [lnAt;ln?
t]. The normality of innova-
tions implies the following equations for bond prices:




pn;t = Et(mt;t+1 + pn 1;t+1) +
Vt(mt;t+1 + pn 1;t+1)
2
= p1;t + Et(pn 1;t+1) + Covt(mt;t+1;pn 1;t+1) +
Vt(pn 1;t+1)
2
(n  2): (20)
9For this reason, there is still a tight link between the level of volatility and market prices of
risk in the learning version unlike the essentially ane term structure models in Duee (2002).9
Based on the above equations, I can recursively dene log bond prices as func-
tions of [x1;t;x2;t;2



























3.1 Estimation Methodology and Data
I use Bayesian estimation methods which combine prior information on the model
parameters with the likelihood generated by sample data. On parameters for which
existing literature provides some guidance, I take informative priors. For others,
I take fairly diuse priors. One popular method in the Bayesian estimation of a
stochastic volatility model is to use a multiple block Metropolis-Hastings algorithm,
which iteratively draws volatilities and parameters conditional on each other.11 In-
stead of integrating out stochastic volatilities in the likelihood evaluation, I obtain
the joint posterior draws of parameters and stochastic volatilities for empirical anal-
ysis.
I apply the econometric methods outlined in the previous section to U.S. macro
and treasury bond data. The macro variables are taken from the Federal Reserve
Database (FRED) at Saint Louis. The measure of output is per-capita real GDP,
which is obtained by dividing real GDP (GDPC1) by total population (POP). For
the in
ation rate, the log dierence of the GDP price index (GDPCTPI) is used.
The nominal interest rate is from the Fama CRSP risk free rate le. I select the
average quote of 3-month treasury bill rate. Five bond yields (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 year) are
10The derivation involves some approximation. The appendix provides the details of the deriva-
tion of log bond prices.
11This method has been used for Bayesian estimation of time-varying VARs in Cogley (2005) and
Benati (2007). Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) apply a similar method to estimate a large scale
DSGE model with time-varying volatility. The details of the estimation procedure are available
from the author upon request.10
from Fama CRSP zero coupon bond yields les. The estimation uses observations
from 1960:QI to 2004:QIV.12
Table 1 presents the sample moments of the nominal variables in my dataset.
In
ation and bond yields are highly persistent but the term spread between the long
rate and the short rate is not as persistent as bond yields. Actually, we can reject a
unit root for the term spread but not for bond yields. Also, we can reject a unit root
for the real short rate but not for in
ation. These statistics are consistent with our
assumption of a nonstationary in
ation target as a common trend for both in
ation
and nominal interest rates.
3.2 Prior and Posterior Distribution of Parameters
Posterior means and 90% probability intervals for all the parameters with the corre-
sponding 90% prior probability intervals are reported in Table 2.13 There are some
parameters whose posterior distributions dier much from prior counterparts. For
example, the estimated volatility of noise is much smaller relative to the estimated
volatility of signal, although the two volatility parameters have the same prior dis-
tribution. The average signal to noise ratio (
?
n;? ) at the posterior mean is 3.55. If
I set the signal to noise ratio in order to match the constant gain in Kalman ltering
used in Erceg and Levin (2003)'s calibration, it is roughly 0.14, which is much lower
than the estimate based on posterior draws. Erceg and Levin (2003) obtain this
number by minimizing the distance between the model implied expected in
ation
and survey evidence over the period 1980:Q4 to 1985:Q4. This low signal to noise
ratio makes in
ation much more volatile than observed over the period after the
mid 1980s.14
12To match the frequency of bond yields with that of the macro data, the monthly observations
of the treasury bill rate and bond yields are transformed into quarterly data by averaging the three
monthly observations per quarter.
13In computing prior intervals, I throw away draws, which imply the indeterminacy of solutions.
Because I impose a huge penalty for a draw implying indeterminacy when I evaluate likelihood in
running MCMC chains, all the posterior draws belong to the determinacy region by construction.
14The DSGE model in this paper allows the time variation of only the volatility of the signal.
In principle, this restriction on the variation of the signal to noise ratio can create a poor t for11
In addition, reoptimizing of prices is found to be more frequent in the posterior
distribution than the prior one. A more frequent reoptimizing means a lower degree
of price rigidity. This nding is consistent with Dewachter and Lyrio (2008) who
nd the estimated slope of Phillips curve is much steeper when term structure data
is included. The parameter is important in evaluating implications of a disin
ation
experiment. When the nominal rigidity is low, the decline of in
ation will lead to a
less severe output loss because prices rather than quantities adjust rapidly.
Table 3 shows prior and posterior means of standard deviations of measurement
errors for interest rates. The posterior mean of the standard deviation of the mea-
surement error of the short rate is 40 - 50 basis points but the posterior means of
standard deviations of other interest rates are much lower, ranging from 6 to 12
basis points.15 Those values are much lower than comparable estimates in Ang,
Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) who estimate dierent Taylor rules with term structure
data by using a no-arbitrage ane term structure model without DSGE restrictions.
The comparison suggests that the DSGE model achieve a reasonable degree of the
in-sample t.
3.3 Learning, In
ation Target and Expected In
ation
The DSGE model in this paper assumes that the nonstationary in
ation target
creates a common trend for in
ation and nominal interest rates. Therefore, we can
test the plausibility of the estimated in
ation target using various implications of
this assumption. First, interest rates and in
ation rate detrended by in
ation target
must be stationary. I perform unit root tests for the detrended short rate and the
detrended in
ation rate using the estimated in
ation target from the DSGE model.
Test statistics suggest that I can reject the existence of a unit root at 5% level in
in
ation after the mid 1980s if the volatility of the noise indeed changed. However, Stock and
Watson (2007) show that the volatility of the transitory component of in
ation measured by GDP
de
ator did not change much over the period 1953:2004 while its permanent component changed a
lot, supporting my assumption.
15We have to multiply 4 to the numbers reported in the Table 3 in order to compute the annualized
percentage.12
both cases. This nding implies that the estimated in
ation target can be a reliable
measure of the trend component of in
ation and nominal interest rates.16
Second, if the estimated in
ation target correctly captures the trend component
of in
ation, the time variation of the target should be in line with the time varia-
tion of long-horizon in
ation expectations. Here, I use a measure of long-horizon
in
ation expectations constructed by Clark and Nakata (2008). This measure of
long-horizon in
ation expectations splices 10-year-ahead expectations from the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters (1990-2007), 5- to 10-year-ahead expectations of the
survey of nancial market participants (1981-89), and econometric estimates using
term structure data (1960-80).17 Correlation coecients between model implied in-

ation expectations and survey data in Table 4 conrm that the model generates
in
ation expectations highly correlated with survey data. Moreover, correlation
becomes stronger when the yield curve data are used in the estimation. While
near term in
ation expectations are relatively well matched by the Bayesian Vector
Autoregression of the order (1) (BVAR (1)), which does not have trend in
ation,
long-horizon in
ation expectations are better matched by the DSGE model. In par-
ticular, BVAR (1) does not generate the volatile movements of long-horizon in
ation
expectations during the 1970-80s as shown in Figure 2.
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) model the imperfect information and learning of
agents about the in
ation target of the central bank in a VAR model estimated
with output gap, in
ation, federal funds rate, and 10-year bond yield. In the model,
in
ation has a trend component. They distinguish central bank's actual target from
the perceived target by private agents and assume agents do not directly observe
the actual target but try to adjust the perceived target toward the actual target
based on the deviation of the short rate from their expectations.
16In contrast, if I estimate in
ation target without using yield curve data, unit roots for nominal
interest rates detrended by the estimated target are not statistically rejected.
17Splicing together dierent sources of information may increase the uncertainty of this measure
but the qualitative pattern of the time variation of this measure seems to be robust to this issue
as pointed by Clark and Nakata (2008). In fact, the same measure is used for the Federal Reserve
Board's FRB/US model as a proxy for long run in
ation expectations.13
Table 4 shows that the perceived target in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) is more
highly correlated with mean one-year ahead in
ation forecasts from survey data
than the estimated in
ation target from the DSGE model.18 However, the correla-
tion with long-horizon in
ation expectations is weaker. The dierence boils down
to the fact that the perceived target in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) continuously de-
clined during the mid-1980s, while the long-horizon in
ation expectations and the
perceived target from the DSGE model deend by the permanent component of the
in
ation target ,Et(?
t+1), showed a temporary upward shift ,as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the gap between the perceived target and the actual target
for both Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)'s model and the DSGE model in this paper.
Compared to the estimates in the DSGE model, the estimates of Kozicki and Tinsley
(2005) are highly persistent and much large. This dierence is attributed to a fairly
slow learning about the actual target. Indeed, we cannot reject a unit root for the
estimated gap between the two targets while they are assumed to be cointegrated in
the model of Kozicki and Tinsley (2005). While the actual target and the perceived
target are cointegrated in the model, estimated gap between the two targets are
close to a random-walk.19 Such a big inertia of learning in Kozicki and Tinsley
(2005) produces observations somewhat at odds with the direct evidence on long-run
in
ation expectations from survey data. For example, Figure 2 shows that survey
data on long run in
ation expectations essentially stabilized at around 2% in the late
1990s but the estimated gap from Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)'s model is still high
in the same period and neither estimate seems to stabilize. In contrast, estimates
of in
ation target from the DSGE model exhibit smaller 
uctuations from the late
1990s. Unlike Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), the DSGE model implies that agents
learn relatively quickly. One motivation of the existing literature to introduce the
imperfect information about the in
ation target is to explain the sluggish adjustment
of in
ation expectations relative to actual in
ation during the Volcker disin
ation
period. In the DSGE model, this relatively sluggish adjustment is explained mainly
18I use data from 1959:Q2 to 2004:Q4 to estimate the same model in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).
19The same issue arises in Dewachter (2008) who estimates a macro-nance model with imperfect
information on the nonstationary in
ation target.14
by the time varying volatility of macro shocks rather than learning.20
4 Conclusion
This paper incorporates information from long-term interest rates to better un-
derstand the Federal Reserve's (implicit) in
ation target in a microfounded DSGE
setup. I identify the drifting in
ation target of the central bank as the common
trend component for in
ation and nominal interest rates. The model incorporates
the imperfect information and learning by agents about the in
ation target of the
central bank.
The resulting estimates of in
ation target are consistent with not only the trend
component of nominal interest rates and in
ation used in the estimation but also
with long-horizon in
ation expectations from survey data which are not used in
the estimation. The estimated volatility of shocks in the model implies that agents
learn more quickly than implied by the calibration in Erceg and Levin (2003) or
estimation results in Kozicki and TInsley (2005). The slow learning speed in the
existing literature tends to generate a very persistent gap between the actual target
and the perceived target even after the Volcker disin
ation period of the early 1980s.
In contrast, the estimated learning speed from the DSGE model is more consistent
with the decline and stabilization of long-horizon in




Under learning, market prices of risk are time-varying and we have to compute
coecients in log bond prices at each period. Strictly speaking, time-varying market
prices of risk should be part of a model's state vector. It can be achieved by including
20In fact, if we assume the constant volatility of macro shocks, the DSGE model generates the slow
adjustment of in
ation expectations in expense of overpredicting actual in
ation. For example, the
constant volatility version of the DSGE model overpredicts in
ation by 0.51% at the third quarter
of 1981 compared to the stochastic volatility version.15
the covariance matrix of the ltered estimate 
t in the state vector. However, doing
so would result in a quite complicated non-ane term structure model because 
t
follows a nonlinear law of motion. I assume that agents update market prices of risk
each period but treat the updated values as if it would remain constant going forward
in time. Cogley (2005) uses a similar approximation in the context of making multi-
step forecasts in a VAR with time-varying parameters and argues that the rst order
impacts of the approximation are small unless precautionary motives are strong. It
turns out that this approximation does not create any signicant dierences in bond
yields.21 With this approximation, we can obtain coecients of log bond prices as
follows:
a1;t = 0 ; b0






an;t = a1;t + an 1;t + b0







n;1 = [0;0; 1;0; ;0] + b0
n 1;1T1 ; b0





cn;t = 0:5(m;t + b;t + 2b;m;t) + cn 1;t ;
m;i;t = 2
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Table 1: Sample Moments
Variables mean standard deviation AR (1) ADF test statistic
in
ation(t) 3.439 2.397 0.891 -2.066
short rate(it) 5.210 2.911 0.947 -1.933
1 year bond yield(y4;t) 5.599 2.911 0.952 -1.809
2 year bond yield(y8;t) 5.809 2.859 0.958 -1.660
3 year bond yield(y12;t) 5.984 2.787 0.962 -1.520
4 year bond yield(y16;t) 6.116 2.752 0.965 -1.447
5 year bond yield(y20;t) 6.198 2.714 0.968 -1.388
term spread (y20;t   it) 0.989 1.007 0.829 -4.077?
ex post real rate(it   t) 1.770 2.234 0.822 -4.116?
Notes: Statistics for the sample observations from 1960:QI to 2004:QIV. ? denotes
the rejection of a unit root at the 5% level.19
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution
Prior P osterior
Parameter 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
 [1.19, 2.80] 2.48 [2.44, 2.52]
 [0.9965, 0.9995] 0.9994 [0.9993, 0.9995]
 [1.19, 2.80] 2.30 [2.22, 2.38]
lnf
? [0.052, 0.147] 0.105 [0.101, 0.110]
 [0.593, 0.913] 0.262 [0.248, 0.274]
u
?
a [0.003, 0.007] 0.007 [0.0069, 0.0073]

p [1.19, 2.79] 1.496 [1.424, 1.584]

y [0.237, 0.558] 0.467 [0.447, 0.484]
a [0.136, 0.461] 0.032 [0.022, 0.046]
f [0.647, 0.958] 0.869 [0.861, 0.876]
i [0.338, 0.669] 0.265 [0.251, 0.277]
100a [0.217, 0.795] 0.325 [0.292, 0.369]
100f [0.213, 0.791] 0.459 [0.428, 0.489]
100i [0.054, 0.199] 0.441 [0.441, 0.441]
100? [0.053, 0.198] 0.103 [0.089, 0.118]
a [0.101, 0.999] 0.9986 [0.9973, 0.9999]
f [0.008, 0.906] 0.994 [0.989, 0.999]
i [0.001, 0.899] 0.267 [0.208, 0.331]
? [0.078, 0.976] 0.996 [0.993, 0.999]
100
2w;a [0.053, 0.198] 0.0248 [0.0226, 0.0269]
100
2w;f [0.054, 0.199] 0.0266 [0.0247, 0.0287]
100
2w;i [0.000, 0.003] 0.0002 [0.0002, 0.0003]
100
2w;? [0.000, 0.003] 0.0004 [0.0004, 0.0004]
lnA0 [9.24, 9.90] 9.72 [9.70, 9.75]
100ln
?
0 [0.104, 0.703] 0.599 [0.567, 0.626]
100n;? [0.053, 0.198] 0.029 [0.025, 0.032]
Notes: Prior intervals are computed based on 100,000 draws. I use 50,000 draws to compute
posterior means and intervals in the learning version.20
Table 3: Standard Deviations of Measurement Errors
100u;1 100u;2 100u;3 100u;4 100u;5 100u;6
Prior 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Posterior 0.130 0.031 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.019
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2007) 0.177 0.111 0.0056 0.034 0.046 0.064
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Table 4: Correlation between Model-implied Inflation Expectations
and Survey Data
Horizon DSGE DSGE (No Yield Data) BVAR (1) KT (2005)
1 year 0.9244 0.7990 0.8442 0.9568
Long run 0.8727 0.6999 0.1720 0.7597
Notes: \For 1 year-ahead in
ation forecasts, I use the mean forecasts of GDP de
ator from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
over the time period 1981:Q3 -2004:Q4. Long run in
ation forecasts are from Clark and Nakata
(2008). In the last column, I compute the correlation between the perceived in
ation target in
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) and survey data.21
Figure 1: Time Series Plots of Data















































Notes: Per capital real GDP, in
ation from GDP de
ator, 3 month Treasury bill
rate, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 year Treasury bond yields from 1960:Q1 to 2004:Q4 are plotted.22
Figure 2: Smoothed Estimates of Perceived inflation target










Long run expected inf., CN (2008)
Perceived target, KT (2005)
Perceived target, DSGE Model
Notes: Long run expected in
ation is from Clark and Nakata (2008) and KT (2005)
denotes estimates from using the same model as Kozicki and Tinsley (2005).23
Figure 3: Smoothed Estimates of the Gap between Perceived Target
and Actual Target








Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)










Notes: For the DSGE model, the gap is dened by Et(?
t+1)   ?
t.